NEW DELHI : THE respondent - Gujarat Maritime Board (" GMB ") is a statutory body constituted under the Gujarat Maritime Board Act, 1981. This authority administers and operates minor ports in the State of Gujarat. GMB entered into an agreement dated 28.2.2000 with Larsen & Toubro which
ultimately became M/s Ultratech Cement Limited (" UCL ") whereby a licence was granted to UCL to construct and use a jetty for landing of goods and raw materials manufactured by UCL in their cement factory which was situated close to the said jetty at Pipavav port.
It is alleged that service tax was payable on wharfage charges by GMB collected by them from their licensee UCL under the taxable category of "port services". A show cause notice dated 6.3.2009 was issued to collect 80% of service tax payable on wharfage charges which was not paid by the assessee. This was for the period 1.10.2003 to 31.3.2006, the differential amount being a sum of Rs.1 ,67,45,620 /-. A further amount of Rs.12 ,53,076 /- was also demanded for the period 2003 October upto 2007-2008 on account of the provision of direct berthing facilities provided for captive cargo of a ship size of 10,000 DWT and above on account of lease rent for use of the waterfront. By the order in original dated 16.7.2009, the Commissioner, Central Excise held that it is clear that the nature of service provided, which is wharfage , is squarely covered under the head "port services" as defined in the Finance Act, 1994. The amount of rebate/concession granted in wharfage charges amounting to 80% allowed to the licensee should, therefore, be included for purposes of calculation of service tax. Equally, the amount that was demanded on account of lease rent for waterfront usage was also confirmed, together with interest and penalty, which was imposed on the assessee.
In appeal from this order, CESTAT reversed the Commissioner's order holding that no service at all was rendered by the Gujarat Maritime Board in relation to any vessel and, therefore, no amount was payable by way of service tax. Equally, on an analysis of the agreement between GMB and UCL , it was held that 20% of wharfage charges which was payable under the agreement was really payable as licence fee/rental and, therefore, the balance 80% being of the nature of licence fee/rental and not being of the nature of payment for services rendered would equally render the payment bad in law.
Revenue Argument : it is clear on a correct reading of the agreement between GMB and UCL that service was rendered by GMB as owner of the jetty, the service being the provision of a space for landing of goods from vessels which are allowed to berth there. As an alternative argument, GMB had authorized UCL to render the service of wharfage and since what was collected was actual wharfage charges in accordance with the schedule of rates prescribed under the Gujarat Maritime Board Act, it was in relation to goods that were loaded or off-loaded from vessels on the said jetty. The reason why only 20% of the wharfage charges was collected and not the entire amount was a pure internal arrangement between GMB and UCL with which revenue is not concerned. The Tribunal's finding that the ownership of the jetty vests in UCL is contrary to the agreement between the parties and that 20% of wharfage levied and collected cannot be said to be rental or licence fee but is wharfage charges collected under the GMB Act for the service of allowing goods to be landed at the said jetty. Gujarat Maritime Board was the owner and in control of the said jetty throughout the term of the agreement and all findings to the contrary by the Tribunal were incorrect.
Assessee's Arguments : the very basis for service tax was absent in the present case as there is no service rendered of any kind by the assessee on the facts of the present case to UCL nor has UCL been authorized by GMB to render any service Act and that, therefore, the authority to levy service tax was absent. The 20% of wharfage charges that was paid under the agreement was really only a measure to calculate what is in fact payable as licence fee and that, therefore, the agreement read as a whole would lead to the conclusion that no service was in fact rendered by the respondent and, therefore, no service tax could be collected.
Section 65(82) defined "port service" as :-
"Port service" means any service rendered by a port or other port or any person authorized by such port or other port, in any manner in relation to a vessel or goods;"
The Supreme Court observed,
The
question which arises is, whether any service is rendered by GMB or by
any person authorized by GMB in relation to a vessel or goods. The
agreement makes it clear that it is the duty of the licensee, i.e., UCL
to maintain the jetty in good order and condition during the tenure of
the agreement. Further, it is UCL that is to provide all services at or
around the jetty including dredging, navigation, water supply etc. This
makes it clear that during the currency of the agreement it is not the
Board but the Licensee who keeps the said jetty in such condition that
it is capable of enabling vessels to berth alongside it to load and
unload goods. This being the position, no service is rendered by GMB to
UCL under the agreement. The agreement makes it clear that it is an
agreement entered into under Section 35 of the GMB Act allowing the
licensee - UCL to construct a jetty and thereafter maintain it at its
own cost. The rebate in wharfage charges of 80% is a condition imposed
statutorily under Section 35 of the said Act. To say that it is in the
nature of lease rent or licence fee, would not be correct inasmuch as a
separate licence fee is payable under the agreement. To that extent the
CESTAT does not seem to be correct in this behalf. But this would make
no difference to the result of this case inasmuch as the very first
condition that must be met under the definition of "port service" is not
met on the facts of the present case.
There
is no doubt on a reading of the agreement that it is the Board itself
that charges or recovers wharfage charges from the licensee - UCL and
does not authorize UCL to recover such charges from other persons. This
being the position, it is clear that no service is rendered by a port or
by any person authorized by such port and, therefore, the very first
condition for levy of service tax is absent on the facts of the present
case. So far as the direct berthing facilities provided for captive
cargo is concerned, the lease rent charged for use of the waterfront
also does not include any service in relation to a vessel or goods and
cannot be described as "port service". This being so, it is unnecessary
to go into any of the other contentions raised by both parties.
The appeals of the revenue are, therefore, dismissed accordingly.
(See 2015-TIOL-155-SC-ST)
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